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roponents of the credit union industry have viewed credit unions as es-
pecially well-suited to making small-value, uncollateralized consumer
loans since the time the ﬁrst United States credit union was formed
in 1909. At that time, other ﬁnancial institutions such as banks and savings
and loans were focused on alternative types of lending, speciﬁcally lending
to businesses as well as to consumers with collateral. For consumers who
lacked real estate or other simple-to-value collateral—in other words for un-
secured borrowers—borrowing options were limited, at least for loans from
depositories.
The high ﬁxed costs of extending a small-value loan, and the signiﬁcant
risk of making an unsecured consumer loan to a borrower about whom the
lender had little information on creditworthiness, meant that a lofty interest
rate was necessary in order for the lender to cover costs. Such rates often
exceeded usury ceilings, maximum interest rates set by state laws. Still, many
borrowers were willing to pay high rates, even if it meant illegal borrowing.
A 1911 estimate indicated that in larger towns and cities, one in ﬁve workers
borrowed from illegal lenders (Calder 1999, 118).
Credit unions developed in this environment, allowing individuals to bor-
rowatfairlylowinterestrates(Whitney1922,40–54). Whenconsumerscould
band together into groups based upon a common bond—i.e., a shared char-
acteristic such as working for the same company—they could substitute their
knowledge of one another’s creditworthiness for collateral. Credit unions
offered creditworthy borrowers the opportunity to differentiate themselves
from less creditworthy individuals in an era before the advent of nationwide
credit bureaus. Credit union members were differentiated from unknown
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borrowersbecauseofin-depthinformationamongthegroupofmembersabout
the character and economic prospects of one another. In 1932, the average
size of a U.S. credit union was only 187 members, so intimate knowledge
among the membership was feasible in the early decades of the industry (U.S.






the credit union. Since members knew one another, and failure to repay a loan
harmed fellow members and damaged the defaulting member’s reputation in
the group, there was social pressure to repay, thus reducing the likelihood of
default, and consequently providing another explanation for low interest rates
on loans from credit unions.
The advent of nationwide credit bureaus, which provided in-depth infor-
mation on the creditworthiness of most consumers, and the growth of credit
card lending as well as loan products that allowed borrowers to inexpen-
sivelyemployrealestatecollateralforsmallloans—forexample, homeequity
lines—the necessity of credit unions as producers of common bond-driven in-
formation on creditworthiness declined. In order to continue to prosper and
grow,whichmanydidsuccessfully,creditunionswererequiredtoevolvefrom
their original structure. To do so, the industry shifted toward mortgage and
credit card lending and, to a smaller degree, toward business lending. The
industry was also granted liberalized membership rules by its regulator and
later by statute.
Asthecreditunionindustryevolvedandmanycreditunionsbecamemore
bank-like in their product offerings, the banking industry expressed growing
concern over a perceived credit union advantage. Speciﬁcally, credit unions
are exempt from federal income taxes, while banks pay such taxes. Credit
union proponents have responded that the tax exemption remains appropri-
ate because credit unions continue to be nonproﬁt, member-owned ﬁnancial
institutions, and because they face restrictions not placed on banks. The
signiﬁcance of the controversy was illustrated in November 2005 when con-
gressional hearings were held to examine the credit union tax-exemption and
itsjustiﬁcationsinthefaceofchangestothecreditunionindustry(U.S.House
of Representatives 2005).
How do banks and credit unions differ, and what is the history behind
these differences? How have these differences changed over time and why?
Observers of the credit union tax exemption controversy might ask such ques-
tions. This article provides a history of the evolution of credit unions and the
market forces behind the evolution, without taking a stand on the merits of
either side of the tax debate.J. R. Walter: Credit Unions 355
1. EARLY HISTORY OF THE CREDIT UNION INDUSTRY
The ﬁrst credit union in the United States, St.Mary’s Cooperative Credit As-
sociation, was chartered in Manchester, New Hampshire, in 1909 (National
Credit Union Administration 2006a). This and other similar credit unions
developed to ﬁll a niche in the loan market that was largely unﬁlled by ex-
isting banks and savings institutions. The niche that they ﬁlled was that of
unsecured, small dollar, consumer loans—for example, for the payment of a
medical bill or to purchase a home appliance.
Lending institutions along the lines of United States credit unions ﬁrst
developed in Europe. Cooperative banks or people’s banks appeared in Ger-
many in the 1850s (Moody and Fite 1984, 1–10). These spread to a number
of other countries, and then to Canada, at the turn of the 20th century, before
coming to the United States.
Initial Leaders of the Credit Union Industry
A number of individuals are credited with the introduction and spread of
credit unions in the United States. Three of the most important areAlphonse
Desjardins, Pierre Jay, and EdwardA. Filene.
Alphonse Desjardins, a Canadian journalist and politician, organized one
of the ﬁrst cooperative banks in Canada, La Caisse Populaire de Levis. Caisse
Populairelooselytranslatestopeople’screditsocietyorpeople’sbank(Moody
and Fite 1984, 12–15). Caisse, located in the city of Levis, Quebec, opened
for business in January 1901, and was modeled after European cooperative
banks which Desjardins had been studying for years. Caisses grew rapidly in
Canada, thanks to Desjardin’s advocacy, numbering 150 by 1914 (Moody and
Fite 1984, 17).
Inlate1908,DesjardinshelpedorganizetheﬁrstcreditunionintheUnited
States, at the request of the priest of St. Mary’s Parish in Manchester. He also
consultedwithPierreJayandEdwardFileneastheypushedforwardthespread
of credit unions in the United States following the formation of St. Mary’s.1
Pierre Jay, Banking Commissioner of Massachusetts, became familiar
with the cooperative banking concept soon after 1900 (Moody and Fite 1984,
22–23). As banking commissioner, he recognized a lack of lenders willing to
makesmall-valueloanstoconsumers. HisinterestledhimtocontactAlphonse
Desjardins. In July 1908, Jay traveled to Ottawa to meet with Desjardins and
learn ﬁrst-hand about les caisses populaires in Canada (Flannery 1974, 14).
InApril 1909, Jay persuaded the Massachusetts legislature to pass legislation
that allowed cooperative banks, named credit unions, to be chartered in that
1 While St. Mary’s was created in late 1908, it did not receive a charter to operate from
the legislature of New Hampshire until early 1909 (Whitney 1922, 16).356 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
state. Then, as now, most states prohibited the gathering of deposits by ﬁrms
lacking a charter that speciﬁcally grants it this power.
Edward Filene was a Boston merchant (of Filene’s Basement fame) who
traveled widely and witnessed successful agricultural cooperative lenders in
India. TheselendersgatheredsmalldepositsfromIndianfarmers,membersof
thelendingcooperative,andmadesmall-valueloanstotheirmembers(Moody
and Fite 1984, 21). Because of his business experience in the United States,
Edward Filene, like Jay, perceived a dearth of small-value lenders and wished
to bring the cooperative bank to the United States.
WhileDesjardinsandJaywereresponsiblefortheﬁrststepsinestablishing
creditunions,Filenecreatedmomentumtoproducegrowthintheindustryover
the coming several decades. His efforts included lobbying legislators to pass
credit union legislation, speaking frequently on the beneﬁts of cooperative
lending, and funding organizations to promote the expansion of credit unions.
Credit union growth was fairly slow between 1909, when the ﬁrst U.S.
credit union opened, and 1920 (Moody and Fite 1984, 32–72). Growth of
credit unions began to pick up in the mid-1920s, as an increasing number of
states passed credit union laws (Moody and Fite 1984, 73). By 1925, credit
union laws had passed in 26 states. In 1925, there were 176 credit unions; this
count had grown to 868 in 1929 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 1,049) and
2,500by1934,whentheFederalCreditUnionActcreatedfederalcreditunion
charters (U.S. Treasury Department 1997, 16). According to Moody and Fite
(1984, 55–108), much of the legislation that made this growth possible was
the result of Edward Filene’s lobbying efforts or the result of efforts ﬁnanced
by him.
Beyond Credit Unions
Credit unions were not the only response to limited borrowing opportunities
for consumers. The Russell Sage Foundation was formed, based on funding
provided by Russell Sage’s widow (Sage was a railroad baron who died in
1906). The foundation soon began advocating for the liberalization of usury
laws for small-value loans. Low usury ceilings in a number of states meant
that small-value consumer loans could not be made proﬁtably. Out of this
advocacy grew a movement to encourage all states to adopt uniform small-
valueloanregulationsthatwouldprovideforfairlyhighusuryceilingsonsmall
consumer loans, while at the same time implementing consumer protection
rules. Approximately two-thirds of the states passed the uniform laws by the
time the Foundation ended its push for such laws in the 1940s (Carruthers,
Guinnane, and Lee 2005).
In addition to the effort of the Russell Sage Foundation, Morris Plan
banks were formed around the country based on a bank founded in Norfolk,
Virginia. The original Morris Plan bank was chartered by Virginia in 1910 atJ. R. Walter: Credit Unions 357
the request of Arthur J. Morris. It gathered deposits from and made small-
value unsecured installment loans to consumers. Morris lowered losses and,
therefore, was able to charge fairly low interest rates, by requiring several
cosigners for all consumer loans. Further, he sidestepped usury ceilings to
some degree by charging loan fees and deducting interest payments from the
loan when it was initially made (Giles 1951, 81–86). Ultimately, Morris
Plan banks were called industrial banks, which remain today in the form of
industrial loan corporations, one of the few bank types that can be owned by
commercial ﬁrms (Walter 2006).2
2. COMMON BOND LENDING




lending efforts in other directions.
Pierre Jay noted the absence of providers of small-value, unsecured loans
in Massachusetts, and foresaw the operating characteristics of credit unions:
What are known in Massachusetts as “cooperative banks,” are excellent
examples of the success of cooperation between savers and borrowers in
an important but limited ﬁeld. Their members are almost entirely salary
and wage earners, who have joined together for systematic saving and
for the owning of their homes. But inasmuch as all of their loans are
secured, either on real estate or on the cash value of their shares, there is
no need for selecting the members, no scrutiny is made of the object of
loans made on the cash value of shares, and but little interest is taken by
the members in the management of the institution. Furthermore they are
of no service to those who have neither real estate nor shares as security,
many of whom undoubtedly have legitimate need for loans. (quoted in
Moody and Fite 1984, 24–25)
2 The early 20th century saw not only the development of the credit union industry, but also
the growth of other cooperative business organizations, i.e., organizations in which customers are
also owners or members. For example, agricultural cooperatives, which began to spread in the
United States in the 1870s, grew rapidly between 1890 and 1920. The number of agricultural
cooperatives peaked, at 14,000 in the 1920s (Frederick 1997). Consumer cooperatives gained pop-
ularity in the 1920s, and cooperatives also formed to provide rural electric and telephone service,
encouraged by the Rural Electriﬁcation Administration, which passed in 1935 (Frederick 1997).358 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
RelationshipsAs a Substitute for Collateral and
Credit Ratings
Creditunionsweresmall, with, asnotedearlier, onaverageonly187members
in1932. Further,theywereformedbasedonacommonbond,wheremembers
knew one another. In other words, members of a common bond likely knew,
at least better than other potential lenders, the economic prospects of the
borrowers who were fellow members.
Alphonse Desjardins noted the beneﬁt of common bond lending when
discussing exceedingly low loan losses at La Caisse Populaire. He claimed
thatlosseswerelowbecause,“Themainsecurityisthefactthattheassociation
is working within a small area and that everybody knows each other” (Moody
and Fite 1984, 16). Pierre Jay had an eye toward the members of a common
bond, monitoring one another while discussing the lack of such monitoring
whenloansaresecuredbyrealestateordeposits(shares),whenhesaid,“there
is no need for selecting members, no scrutiny is made of the object of loans.”
At the time, nationwide consumer credit rating agencies did not exist,
though there were credit rating agencies in some of the larger cities. Because
ofthelackoftheseagencies,itwasdifﬁcultforlenderstodifferentiatebetween
creditworthy and non-creditworthy consumers. The common bond acted as a
substitute, allowing its members to differentiate good credit risks from poor
credit risks.
Monitoring Within the Common Bond
Not only were members of small credit unions, or the credit committee, likely
to know something of the ﬁnancial circumstances of their fellow members,
they had incentive to deny loans to poor credit risks and to monitor borrowers.
Federaldepositinsurancecoveragewasnotgrantedtocreditunionsuntil1970.
A few states had state insurance schemes for credit unions, but in general,
depositors were subject to losses when borrowers failed to repay (Flannery
1974, 26). Depositors faced the danger that if losses were large enough they
might lose principal on their deposits.
Theviewthatcommonbondlendingcontainedthismonitoringadvantage
was expressed byAlphonse Desjardins when he noted that “a second security
[in addition to members’knowledge of one another’s creditworthiness] is that
everybody is interested by being a shareholder” (Moody and Fite 1984, 16).
In effect, common bond lending used social pressure from associates in-
steadofthethreatofconﬁscationofcollateral,toensureloanrepayment. Since
these associates suffered loss due to a member’s default, the social pressure
to repay was likely signiﬁcant. The borrower knows that if he does not repay,
he is costing his associates lost interest earnings and perhaps lost principal.
A 1922 Department of Labor study of early credit unions reported that
loans were typically made without collateral, but with careful scrutiny ofJ. R. Walter: Credit Unions 359
the character of the borrower by the credit committee—typically the loan
decision-making body in credit unions (Whitney 1922, 33). Small loans were
made on the signature of the borrower only, while loans over $50 required the
endorsementoftwoothercreditunionmembers. Accordingtothis1922study,
typical interest rates charged by credit unions ranged from 6 to 12 percent per
annum (Whitney 1922, 40–54).3
Still, the incentive of any individual member to keep an eye on another
borrower is somewhat muted. The cost of one member’s efforts to monitor
another member’s ﬁnancial condition is borne only by that member, but the
beneﬁt if loans are properly denied, or remedial action is taken, is shared by
all members in the form of higher returns on their credit union deposits.4
Reputational Incentive to Repay
While members’ incentive to monitor one another’s loans in order to protect
credit union earnings may be muted, there is another reason to expect bor-
rowers within a common bond group to repay. Members of a credit union are
likely to have many valuable interactions with one another, outside of inter-
actions through the credit union. Failure to repay a loan is likely to damage
the reputation of the defaulting borrower and undercut these interactions.5
For instance, members of a credit union who share the common bond of
working for the same company may worry that defaulting on a credit union
loan will decrease their opportunities for advancement. Their co-workers,
including supervisors, would be likely to learn of the default, undercutting the
defaulting worker’s reputation.
Further, a credit union member who shares a close common bond with
fellow members might be concerned that his default could damage his rep-
utation and limit social interactions with members. For example, the credit
union borrower might believe that members will view a default as a sign of
dishonesty and, therefore, be less willing to include him in conﬁdences.
3 The author of the 1922 study notes that some credit union loans were made on collateral
such as deposits in the credit union, stocks, or real estate collateral (Whitney 1922, 40).
4 Group lending, whereby loans are made to members of a group and all members of the
group are jointly liable for each other’s debts, can provide strong incentive to members to mon-
itor and discipline one another to ensure repayment. Group lending, which, like common bond
lending, uses social connections to encourage repayment, has received wide attention as a means
of inexpensively lending to individuals for whom little formal information on creditworthiness is
available. Group lending and a number of interesting examples as practiced in developing countries
are discussed and explored in Prescott (1997).
5 Besley and Coate (1995) develop a model which is used to explore the ways “social con-
nectedness” can encourage debt repayment.360 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Members of a common bond will be aware of the potential damage to
one’s reputation. As a result, they will be less likely to default because of
the potential damage to other interactions with fellow members of a common
bond.
3. FACTORS DIFFERENTIATING CREDIT UNIONS FROM
OTHER DEPOSITORIES
Creditunionssharemanyfeaturescommontoalldepositoryinstitutions: they
gather savings and transaction deposits, make various types of loans, and
employ branch networks, ATMs, telephone service departments, and Web
sites to provide services to their customers. They are insured by an agency of
thefederalgovernment, receiveachartertooperate, andarecloselyregulated.
Beyond these similarities, credit unions are distinct. They differ from most
depositories in that they are mutually owned, rather than stockholder-owned.
Anotherdistinctionistheirgreaterconcentrationonunsecuredlending,though
the growth of credit card lenders has meant that credit unions are less distinct
here. While other depositories take deposits from and make loans to anyone
meetingcreditworthinessrequirements,creditunionsfacerestrictionslimiting
whom they may accept as customers. Last, credit unions have the unique
advantage of being exempt from federal taxes.
Mutual Ownership
State credit union laws and the Federal Credit Union Act require that credit
unions be cooperative or mutually owned organizations. This implies that
a credit union’s members, meaning its depositors, are also its owners. As
a result, depositors have the right to vote for the members of the board of
directors of the credit union, who, in turn, hire managers who run the day-to-
day operations of the credit union.
Credit unions do not raise equity by selling shares in the equity markets,
as do nonmutual corporations. Instead, credit unions raise equity by retaining
earnings. Credituniondepositors,asowners,areduenotonlytherepaymentof
theirdepositsandanyinterestowedtothem, butalsothecreditunion’sequity,
meaning funds that might remain after all liabilities are repaid if the credit
union is dissolved. Consequently, credit union depositors are the residual
claimants to the credit union’s assets, like corporate shareholders, explainingJ. R. Walter: Credit Unions 361
why credit union deposits are often called “shares.” Depositors in most other
depository institutions are due only the repayment of deposits plus interest.6
Uncollateralized Consumer Lending
Beyond their ownership, credit unions were originally set apart from other
depositories by their emphasis on small-value, nonmortgage loans to individ-
uals and households, meaning uncollateralized loans for household expenses
and the purchase of consumer durables. For example, in the early 1920s, the
averagesizeloanmadebycreditunionsinMassachusettsandNewYork—two
states in which numerous credit unions operated—was $272 ($3,092 in cur-
rent dollar terms) in Massachusetts and $169 ($1,720) in NewYork (Whitney
1922, 55).
With the exception of some securities investments, credit union assets
were devoted almost completely to loans to individuals. The earliest data on
the types of loans credit unions made comes from a 1948 survey of federally
chartered credit unions conducted by the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions.
The survey indicated that the largest categories were loans for the purchase
of automobiles to consolidate loans for current living expenses and medical
expenses (U.S. Bureau of Federal Credit Unions 1948, 4).
In contrast to credit unions, savings and loans and savings banks focused
on mortgage lending and commercial banks on business lending. In the case
of mutual savings banks, as of 1910, mortgages and investments in securities
accounted for 89 percent of assets (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975, 1,046).
Figures on types of lending by savings and loans is reported starting with
1929, when mortgages accounted for 75 percent of all assets (U.S. Bureau of
the Census 1975, 1,047). Data on types of loans and assets for commercial
banks are reported beginning with 1939. During that year, 91 percent of bank
assets were accounted for by loans to businesses, securities investments, cash
holdings, and mortgage lending (Board of Governors 1959, 34–35). In each




6Another group of depository institutions, mutual savings banks, which traditionally focused
on home mortgage lending, are like credit unions, also owned by depositors.
The advantages and disadvantages of mutual ownership relative to stockholder ownership have
been studied widely, especially in the insurance industry, where both types of ownership are preva-
lent. Generally these studies ﬁnd that the choice is driven by conﬂicts of interest between owners
and managers on one hand, and owners and customers on the other. Examples of such studies
are Mayers and Smith (2002), Mayers and Smith (1986), and Fama and Jensen (1983).362 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
unions. The shift into mortgage lending after 1977 contributed to growth in
loan size at credit unions, such that in March 2006 the average credit union
loan was $10,903 (National Credit UnionAdministration 2006b).
During the 1940s, credit unions had little opportunity to compete for
mortgage loans (as discussed later), but by 2006, such loans accounted for
32 percent of all assets. Nevertheless, credit unions continue to exhibit con-
siderably greater emphasis on nonmortgage loans to individuals, which as of
March 2006, accounted for 31 percent of all of their assets, compared to 8
percent for commercial banks, savings banks, and savings and loans (Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation 2006, 5).
Restricted Customer Base
An additional important factor differentiating credit unions from other depos-
itories is that they have traditionally been required by state and federal law
to choose their members from one group. Speciﬁcally, a credit union must
focus on a group sharing one of three forms of afﬁnity: (1) a common bond of
association such as a fraternal or religious organization, (2) an occupation, or
(3) residence in a single community, neighborhood, or rural district. In other
words, unlike banks, savings and loans, and savings banks, credit unions face
restrictions that limit with whom they may do business.
Theapparentgoalofthislimitationistoprotectthehealthofcreditunions,
as members are more likely to repay loans given that failure to repay harms
fellow members of their own group (Robbins 2005, 3). While this repayment
beneﬁt may ﬂow from the common bond requirement, there is also a serious
disadvantage. Creditunionsboundtoacceptmembersonlyfromoneemployer
orcommunityarelikelytosufferfromaseverelackofdiversiﬁcation. Limited
diversiﬁcation may have contributed to high failure rates among small credit
unions in the late 1970s and 1980s (Wilcox 2005, 2–3).
Tax Exemption
Taxexemptionistheﬁnal,andmostcontroversial,differenceseparatingcredit
unions from other depositories. Credit unions are free from federal income
taxes. All of a credit union’s net earnings, meaning earnings after paying
expenses,willbepaidouttoitsowners(depositors)asinterestanddividendsor
retained by the credit union as capital; none goes to federal taxes. In contrast,
before a bank can make dividend payments to its owners (shareholders) or
retain capital, it must pay a portion of its net earnings as federal income
taxes.7
7 Since credit unions do not raise capital by issuing equity to investors, they are at a dis-
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While commercial banks have never been tax exempt and mutual savings
andloansandmutualsavingsbankslosttheirtax-exemptstatusintheRevenue
Act of 1951, credit unions remain tax exempt even though this status has
been questioned by representatives of other portions of the ﬁnancial services
industry.
Section 501(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code grants tax-exempt status
to federal credit unions. Section 501(c)(14) of the Code does the same for
state-chartered credit unions as long as they do not have capital stock, are
mutuals, and are nonproﬁt. In 1998, legislators explained and afﬁrmed credit
unions’ tax-exempt status in the Credit Union Membership Access Act. The
act stated that credit unions are tax exempt because they “are member-owned,
democratically operated, not-for-proﬁt organizations generally managed by
volunteer boards of directors and because they have the speciﬁed mission
of meeting the credit and savings needs of consumers, especially persons of
modest means.” (U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and
Means 2005).
Credit unions are granted an advantage relative to their competitors be-
cause they are tax exempt. One measure of the size of this advantage is the
total amount of taxes avoided. In a 2001 study, the Department of Treasury
estimated that federal tax revenues of between $1.3 billion and $1.6 billion
per year were lost due to credit unions’ tax-exempt status (U.S. Department
of the Treasury 2001a).
If credit unions paid this $1.6 billion to their depositors in the form of
greater interest on deposits, the advantage would amount to about 30 basis
points($1.6billiondividedby$550billionintotalcredituniondepositsequals
.29 percent). Alternatively, if they passed it along in lower loan interest rates,
the basis point advantage would be about the same (as the dollar amount of
loans and deposits are about the same).
Still, it seems likely that at least part of the tax advantage move in other
directions. Someoftheadvantageislikelytobeshiftedtowardcapitalholdings
at credit unions and higher salaries and expenses.
While tax exemption may provide as much as a 30 basis point advantage
that can be used to attract customers to a credit union, the advantage is un-
dercut by two other considerations. The ﬁrst consideration is that many small
banks are organized as Subchapter S corporations. Within certain limits, S
corporationspaynofederalincometaxesandcan,likecreditunions,devoteall
earnings either to dividends and interest, retained capital, or some of all three.
As of March 2006, about 2,400 FDIC-insured institutions (commercial banks,
Instead, credit unions increase equity only by retaining earnings. The inability to quickly add to
their equity can be a disadvantage if they wish to grow rapidly. This disadvantage, compared to
banks, is offset somewhat because credit union earnings are not diminished by taxes, leaving more
earnings that might be retained.364 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
savings and loans, and savings banks), or 27 percent of all FDIC-insured in-
stitutions, were organized as S corporations (Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration 2006, 4–5).
The second consideration that limits, somewhat, the advantage of credit
unions over non-tax-exempt banks is the current fairly low dividend tax rate
of 15 percent. As an example, assume a taxed bank earns $100 million dol-
lars, pays federal taxes (of $35 million at the top federal corporate tax rate
of 35 percent), and pays out as dividends all of its remaining earnings. Its
shareholders then pay taxes on the dividends at the current dividend tax rate
of 15 percent. Ultimately, bank shareholders receive $55 million in earnings.
In contrast, shareholders (customers) in credit unions receive $65 million
after taxes. While they do not face double taxation as corporate sharehold-
ers do, since the credit union pays no taxes before paying them interest or
dividends, the tax rate on payments to credit union shareholders is the indi-
vidual tax rate, which can be as high as 35 percent. The bottom line is that
the tax advantage may be smaller than one might imagine.8
4. SIZE RELATIVE TO BANKS
As of December 2005, there were about 9,000 credit unions, 3,600 of which
were state-chartered and 5,400 of which were federal credit unions (Credit
UnionNationalAssociation2006). Insum,these9,000creditunionsheld$700
billion in assets. In comparison, there were 8,800 banks, savings and loans,
and savings banks, together holding $10.9 trillion in assets. Several banks,
individually, have assets that exceed the total assets of the sum of all credit
unions. Nevertheless, with 87 million members as of 2005, credit unions are
important competitors in the market for consumer loans and deposits (Credit
Union NationalAssociation 2006).
Like banks, credit unions come in a wide range of sizes. Still, compared
to banks, a much higher proportion of credit unions are very small. Approx-
imately 46 percent of all credit unions are smaller than $10 million in assets
(Credit Union NationalAssociation 2006). Only 79 banks, or 1 percent of all
banks,haveassetsbelowthisthreshold. Inpart,thissizedifferencereﬂectsthe
long-standing focus of credit unions on retail deposits and loans compared to
banks’focusonlendingtoﬁrmsandholdingtheirdeposits. Commercialloans
account for only 2.5 percent of all credit union assets, though this amount
has grown fairly rapidly in recent years. This contrasts with banks where
8 Because these calculations of amounts received by bank and credit union shareholders are
made assuming the highest tax rates (corporate and individual rates), they cannot be considered
accurate for all shareholders. For example, credit union shareholders in lower tax brackets (pre-
sumably a majority of shareholders) will receive higher after-tax earnings.J. R. Walter: Credit Unions 365
































































Notes: Commercial bank data are from FDIC. Credit union data are from Credit Union
National Association.
commercial loans amount to about 22 percent of total assets (Credit Union
NationalAssociation 2006).
Nevertheless, there are some large credit unions, even by bank standards.
For example, 104 credit unions had assets greater than $1 billion as of June
2005 (Callahan andAssociates 2006, 44–46).
Whilecomparedtobanks,mostcreditunionsaresmall,asFigure1shows.
Yet, thesizeoftheaveragecreditunionhasgrownsigniﬁcantlyovertheyears.
Figure 2 demonstrates that, relative to banks, credit union assets have grown
fairly consistently. They increased from less than 1 percent of bank assets in
1944 to about 3.5 percent in 1981. Growth was especially rapid relative to
banks during the 1980s and early 1990s, as membership restrictions were ﬁrst
being eased and banks were experiencing a widespread decrease in proﬁts.
More recently, growth has been less robust in relation to bank assets (see
Figure 2).366 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
























The ﬁrst credit union in the United States operated under a special charter
granted speciﬁcally to that credit union by the New Hampshire legislature in
1909.9 As noted earlier, over a period of years following the 1909 chartering
oftheﬁrstcreditunion,otherstatespassedlawsgivingcredit-union-chartering
authority to state banking agencies. Credit unions were required to seek state
charters, otherwise they would have run afoul of state laws stipulating that de-
posits may be accepted only by entities holding government-issued charters.
9A 1922 study of cooperative lending associations notes that there were several credit union-
like ﬁnancial institutions operating even before 1909. For example, a cooperative association was
created for employees of the Boston Globe in 1892. It gathered deposits from employees and
made small-value loans to them. The Boston Globe Cooperative Association, and several other
similar associations, operated without legal authority, leading the Massachusetts banking commis-
sioner, Pierre Jay, to call for a law authorizing these activities (Whitney 1922, 17).J. R. Walter: Credit Unions 367
These early charter laws typically speciﬁed rules such as how credit unions
might be founded, from whom they might gather deposits (credit union mem-
bers),towhomtheymightmakeloans(typicallyonlytomembers),whomight
becomemembers(thosesharingacommunityoroccupationalbond),andhow
an individual might become a member (by purchasing at least one share in
the credit union) (Whitney 1922, 21–29). State banking agencies not only
chartered credit unions, but also oversaw their operations, including sending
examiners to review their activities (Whitney 1922, 48).
A federal charter for credit unions was created in 1934. At that time,
39 states had laws authorizing credit unions and there were 2,028 state credit
unions(Giles1951,106; U.S.BureauoftheCensus1975,1,049). TheFederal
Credit UnionAct, enacted on June 26, 1934, created a federal agency to grant
charterssothatcreditunionscouldbeformedinanystateregardlessofwhether
that state offered charters to credit unions. The federal agency was placed in
the Farm CreditAdministration (Moody and Fite 1984, 120).
Overtheyearstheagencyresponsibleforfederalcreditunionswashoused
in government entities. It was moved to the FDIC in April 1942 and then in
July 1948 to the Federal Security Agency—later renamed the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (Croteau 1956, 121).
Current Regulatory Environment
In March 1970, legislation was enacted to create an independent agency, the
National Credit UnionAdministration (NCUA) (Moody and Fite 1984, 304).
The NCUA charters and supervises all federal credit unions. State credit
unions continue to be chartered and examined by state agencies.
Also in 1970, credit unions gained federal deposit insurance when the
Federal Credit Union Act was amended in October of that year to create the
NationalCreditUnionShareInsuranceFund(NCUSIF).TheFundisoverseen
by the NCUA.All federal credit unions must join the fund and state-chartered
credit unions may choose to join.
TheamendmentthatcreatedtheNCUSIFpassedinspiteoftheobjections
of the credit union industry, which argued that insurance premiums would
be high and losses from credit union failures had been quite low historically
(Moody and Fite 1984, 304). While opposed in the beginning, insurance is
now almost universal; only 191 state-chartered credit unions, out of the total
of 3,600 such credit unions, operate without NCUSIF coverage (Callahan and
Associates 2006, 19).
6. ADVANTAGES OF COMMON BOND LENDING DIMINISH
In the second half of the 20th century, a number of factors combined to slowly
undercut the advantages of common bond lending relative to other forms of368 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
lending. First, nationwide credit-reporting agencies emerged and expanded
in the 1970s, lowering the cost of lending to consumers with whom the lender
hadnodirectcontact. Credit-reportingagenciesarecompaniesthatgatherand
sell information about individual consumers, information that can be used to
predict the likelihood that a consumer will repay a debt. Second, in the 1980s
and 1990s the home equity line of credit was developed and became widely
available, allowing consumers to easily tap their home equity for small pur-
chases. Third, credit card lending developed as a convenient, and reasonably
low-cost means of making small, unsecured loans. And fourth, the advent of
depositinsuranceeliminatedsomeofthesocialpressurethatmightbebrought
to bear on members who failed to repay loans.
GrowingAvailability of Creditworthiness Information
Until the 1970s, credit information was gathered largely only on a local ba-
sis, and on just a limited number of consumer variables. For example, Trans
Union,oneofseveralnationwidecredit-reportingagencies,enteredthecredit-
reporting business in 1969 by purchasing a local credit-reporting agency, and
then expanding nationwide, and developing the computer technology to store
and retrieve broad, detailed records on millions of consumers over the next
several years (Trans Union 2006b). Before computers were employed, in-
formation was necessarily limited to a few items on each consumer, and was
difﬁcult to retrieve quickly.
Today, three credit-reporting agencies—Equifax Credit Information Ser-
vices,TransUnion,andExperianInformationSolutions—gatherandmaintain
information that lenders consider predictive of debt repayment on the major-
ity of United States consumers. Such information can include the consumer’s
debtandbillrepaymenthistory, bankruptcies, liens, numberofloansandlines





the agencies before deciding to make a loan. Because many borrowers know




the relative advantages of creditworthiness knowledge gained by maintaining
direct contact with the borrower through a common bond and the motivation
to repay produced by common bond relationships are reduced.J. R. Walter: Credit Unions 369
Home Equity Lines of Credit
The spread of home equity lines of credit (HELOCs) also tended to undercut
the advantage of common bond lending. Prior to the mid-1980s spread of
home equity loans, it was difﬁcult for a consumer to make use of the equity
builtupinhisorherhouseascollateralforaloan(Canner,Durkin,andLuckett
1998, 242). Second mortgages were often taken on homes to make a large,
one-time purchase. But closing and other transaction costs made such loans
expensive to use for making smaller and more frequent consumer purchases.
The development of HELOCs greatly expanded the ability of consumer
borrowers to tap the equity in their homes and, thereby, collateralize
borrowings for occasional consumer expenditures.10 With a HELOC, the
consumer bears the closing costs only once, but then can borrow as frequently
as desired by simply writing a check against the HELOC. Further, such loans
are far less risky than uncollateralized loans, and, therefore, allow lenders
to offer consumers a lower rate of interest. The growing availability of HE-
LOCs greatly diminished the need to employ the collateral substitution ability
provided by common bond lending, at least for consumers with home equity.
Credit Card Lending Use Expands
Credit card lending makes use of a cost savings similar to that provided by
HELOC lending. Once the credit card lending arrangement is established,
costs of drawing down the credit card line are minimal for the lender and for
theconsumer. Thecreditcardcompanymakesaninitialcreditdecision, based
largely upon information from credit-reporting agencies, on whether to grant
a loan to a consumer, at what rate, and how large a line. The consumer is then
free to draw on the line in whatever increments he or she chooses, and to pay
it down over a period largely determined by the consumer.
Credit card availability grew rapidly following a 1978 Supreme Court de-
cision,whichallowedcreditcardlenderstoavoidstateusuryceilings(Athreya
2001, 11–15). Because credit cards offer low-transaction-cost lending, based
on detailed creditworthiness information from the ﬁles of credit reporting
agencies, credit card lending offered an additional strong alternative to com-
mon bond lending.
Credit Unions Receive Federal Deposit Insurance
The 1970 application of federal deposit insurance to credit unions also tended
to undercut an advantage of common bond lending. Before federal deposit
10 Weinberg (2005) provides a thorough analysis of the growth in recent decades of consumer
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insurance was extended to credit unions, credit union members had reason to
monitor one another’s loan repayment. Any defaults increased the probability
ofthefailureofthecreditunionandlossestoitsdepositors. Sharingacommon
bond also meant that borrowers were likely to have frequent contact with
one another and, therefore, the opportunity to bring pressure on delinquent
borrowers. Additionally, frequent contact implies that a borrower might face
signiﬁcant embarrassment if he or she defaults.11
But once credit unions gained federal deposit insurance, the incentive
to monitor repayment was reduced. With insurance in place, members are
protected against loss of principal and interest if a default or several defaults
cause the failure of the credit union. If the default is too small to cause the
failure of the credit union but leads to a reduction in interest payments, a
competitive market for deposits means that members can simply shift their
deposits to another depository, paying an unreduced interest rate.
7. CREDIT UNIONS EVOLVE
As the beneﬁts of common bond lending declined for reasons discussed pre-
viously, the credit union industry moved in directions that tended to de-
emphasize this form of lending. As long as common bonds were important
to consumer lending, one would expect credit unions to operate with fairly
small memberships in order to take advantage of the tighter bonds present in
smaller groups. Once the advantage of the common bond is undercut, credit
unions should tend to move toward the size of other depositories that are not
focused on common bond lending. Further, one would expect credit unions
to begin to place greater emphasis on other forms of lending. This movement
is evident (1) in the growing average size of credit unions, encouraged to a
degreebyliberalizationsthatbroadenedthepotentialmembershipbaseofany
given credit union, and (2) the move of credit unions into real estate, credit
card, and business lending.
Common Bond Requirement Loosened
The strict common bond requirement for credit unions ended in 1982. In that
year, the NCUA began to allow single credit unions to draw members from
multiple groups. At the time, the failure rate of credit unions was at a histori-
cally high level. Failures were likely driven, in part, by the inability of credit
unions to achieve diversiﬁcation due to tight common bond membership lim-
itations (Wilcox 2005, 1, 3). For example, a credit union with a membership
11Athreya (2004) ﬁnds evidence that fear of embarrassment or stigma remains today as an
important incentive to repay. His ﬁnding contrasts with an often-cited view that the stigma has
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comprised completely of employees of one ﬁrm is likely to face heavy losses
if the employer goes out of business.
While in 1998 the Supreme Court determined that the NCUA had over-
stepped its statutory limits when it approved multiple groups for one credit
union, this decision was nulliﬁed almost immediately by legislation. In 1998,
shortly after the Supreme Court decision, Congress passed, and President
Clinton signed, the Credit Union Membership Access Act, which authorized
individual credit unions to serve multiple groups, within some restrictions.
The credit union industry had lobbied aggressively for passage of this liberal-
ization (Gill 1998).
The move to allow multiple groups along with mergers of credit unions,
which were frequent in the 1980s, offered credit unions the opportunity to
enlarge their membership base and size. As seen in the growth rates plotted
in Figure 1, year-after-year growth in the average size of credit unions in-
creased, in constant dollars, at historically high rates between 1982 and 1987,
following the liberalization of membership requirements. Overall, average
size increased from $7.5 million in 1981 to $77.7 million in 2005; though the
annual growth rate after 1987 is about the same as it was before 1982.
In1920,theaveragenumberofmemberspercreditunionwas200. Bythis
measure, creditunionsremainedfairlysmall, evenin1960, withanaverageof
598memberspercreditunion. By2005,theaveragecreditunionmembership
had risen to 10,000. Regarding lending decisions, there is probably little
opportunity to use special knowledge gained from direct contact between
members.12 Further, it seems likely that embarrassment and social pressure
will play a less important role in institutions with thousands of members than
in small institutions in which members are known to one another.
Credit Unions Gain Mortgage Lending Powers
Federal credit unions gained the authority to make long-term (up to 30 years)
mortgage real estate loans in 1977 with amendments made to the Federal
Credit Union Act by Public Law 95-22. Before these amendments passed,
federal credit unions were limited to providing short-term mortgage loans
such as second mortgages and mobile home loans (Credit Union National
Association 1978, 12).
State-chartered institutions in a number of states had this authority prior
to 1977. Consequently, at the beginning of 1978, credit unions held $2.55
billion in ﬁrst mortgages, which accounted for 6.2 percent of all credit union
12 Karlan (2005) ﬁnds that for members of a group-lending organization in Peru, loans are
more frequently repaid by members of groups who live close to one another and who are more
culturally similar. This result occurs because such individuals are better able to monitor one an-
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loans. Since 1977, ﬁrst mortgage real estate lending has grown in importance
as a percentage of credit union lending. As of 2005, mortgages amounted to
32percentofallloans(CreditUnionNationalAssociation2006). Ascommon
bond lending became less necessary, credit unions moved more extensively
into real estate lending.
Growth of Credit Card Lending
Similarly,creditcardlendinghasgrowninimportanceforcreditunions,sothat
todaysuchlendingaccountsforalargepercentageofallunsecuredlendingby
credit unions. Approximately 54 percent of credit unions offer credit cards,
and the percentage rises from very low at the smallest credit unions to 98
percent at the largest (Credit Union National Association 2005). Since this
type of lending is most important for the largest credit unions, (those with the
largest membership) it seems unlikely that common bond lending can play
much of a role in this new category of credit union assets.
Expanded Business Lending
During the last several years, credit unions expanded their business lending
signiﬁcantly, doubling the amount of such loans over the three years before
2005 (Credit Union National Association 2006). Speciﬁcally, business loans
increased from $8.3 billion, in 2002, to $16.9 billion, or 2.5 percent of credit
union assets, in 2005. In comparison, in 2005, business loans accounted for
22percentoftotalassetsatcommercialbanks(FDIC2005). Sincetheseloans
are typically collateralized and made for business purposes, they are beyond
the historical credit union emphasis on uncollateralized consumer lending.
Still, the extent of business lending by credit unions is limited. The 1998
Credit Union Membership Access Act set limits on credit union lending to
businesses. Speciﬁcally, thesumofallbusinessloansofafederalcreditunion
maynotexceed1.75percentofitsnetworthor12.25percentofitstotalassets,
whichever is the lesser (National Credit Union Administration 2004, Section
723.16).
8. CONCLUSION
Credit unions once focused almost entirely on small-value, unsecured con-
sumer lending. Other depositories, speciﬁcally commercial banks, savings
banks, and savings and loans, emphasized lending to businesses or making
large-dollar-value consumer loans based on real estate collateral. For unse-
cured consumer lending, the credit union model of taking deposits from and
lending to a tightly knit group of members of a community or organizationJ. R. Walter: Credit Unions 373
wasanidealbusinessmodelintheearlypartofthe20thcentury,ﬁllinganiche
in the marketplace at that time.
Buttheﬁnancialmarketplacechangedgreatlyinthesecondhalfofthe20th
century. Computerdatabasesandnetworksallowedtheinexpensivecollection
and dissemination of consumer creditworthiness information. Home owner-
ship spread and products developed that allowed consumers to borrow against
their home equity for repeated small-value loans. Further, the availability and
use of credit cards as a vehicle for unsecured consumer loans expanded im-
mensely. The combination of these factors required credit unions to change
as well.
Credit unions shifted away from their heavy emphasis on unsecured con-
sumer loans into mortgage lending, other forms of collateralized consumer
lending(suchasautoloans), creditcardlending, andbusinesslending. Today,
unsecuredconsumerloansaccountforonlyabout10percentofallcreditunion
loans. Autoloansareresponsiblefor37percent,andmortgagescomprisemost
of the remainder (Credit Union NationalAssociation 2005).
Additionally,whiletheverysmallcreditunionwaswell-suitedtocommon
bond lending, small size became less advantageous as common bond lending
lost its advantage over the last several decades. Concurrently, the average
number of members and size of credit unions increased signiﬁcantly. Never-
theless, a large portion of credit unions remain quite small in comparison to
commercial banks. By evolving with changes in the marketplace, the credit
union industry remained healthy and grew, both in terms of dollar amounts
and relative to other depositories.
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